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FROM THE BENCH

CONFRONTATION AND HEARSAY: NEW
WINE IN AN OLD BOTTLE
THE HONORABLE ANTHONY

M. BRANNON*

After jury selection and opening statements come the prosecution witnesses. The Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."' One would think that the Sixth Amendment or "Confrontation Clause" requires a prosecutor to put
available and competent witnesses on the stand so the defendant
can confront them face to face while the jury carefully looks on
both accuser and accused. Until January 15, 1992, this was a correct statement of the law. After that date, it is no longer a correct
statement of the federal law. What happened on January 15,
1992? White v. Illinois2 was decided by the United States
Supreme Court.
* Senior Resident Superior Court Judge for the 14th Judicial District;
Former District Attorney for the State of North Carolina; Adjunct Faculty
Member at UNC-CH School of Business, Duke University Department of Policy
Science and the North Carolina Central University School of Law.
Portions of this paper appeared as CLE material in presentations by this
writer in seminars for the UNC Law School and the North Carolina Association
of Public Defenders, and the View From The Bench, 2nd Division, N.C. Bar
Association.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI
2. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994

1

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1

I. BACKGROUND

The Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution, including
the Sixth Amendment, was ratified and became a part of the
United States Constitution on December 15, 1791. From that date
until 1965, there was comparatively little case law interpreting
the Sixth Amendment. But all that changed in 1965 when the
United States Supreme Court, in the case of Pointer v. Texas,'
extended the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to the states by
way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
From that time until Mancusi v. Stubbs,' the United States
Supreme Court handed down a total of eight Confrontation Clause
cases in seven years. Those eight cases are difficult if not impossible to reconcile, and they were the subject of much adverse law
review commentary. 5 From that unsettled arena, the Court
apparently decided to leave the matter alone until 1980 when it
handed down the case of Ohio v. Roberts.6 While the case dealt
with "prior testimony"' as its factual background, the Court's
opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, did not treat that as of significance. Two paragraphs from that opinion, particularly the second, had been taken by many to be the definitive definition and
application of the Confrontation Clause to hearsay evidence as it
might appear in any and all State and Federal criminal trials.
The Court first summarized the justification for its rule:
The Court has applied this "indicia of reliability" requirement
principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest
upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the "substance of the Constitutional protection." This reflects the truism that "hearsay rules
and the Confrontation Clause" are generally designed to protect
similar values" . . . and "stem from the same roots." It also
3. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (holding that an accused's right to confront witnesses
is a fundamental right protected by the fourteenth amendment).

4. 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (holding that statements made by a now unavailable
witness during a prior trial are admissible if the witness was subject to adequate
cross examination).

5. See, e.g., JoAnne A. Epps, Passingthe ConfrontationClause Stop Sign: Is
All Hearsay Constitutionally Admissible?, 77 Ky. L.J. 7 (1989); Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional
UnavailabilityRequirement, 70 MINN. L. REv. 665 (1986); Randolph N. Jonakait,
Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV.
557 (1988).
6. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
7. Id. at 68.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss1/1
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responds to the need for certainty in the workaday world of con8
ducting criminal trials.
The Court concluded with a recapitulation of the rule:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a
showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is
admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 9
In retrospect, it is perhaps significant that even in Roberts Justice Blackmun said in footnote number seven that "[a] demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always required." 10
Since the Supreme Court set forth a definitive two-prong constitutional test, (1) unavailability and (2) reliability, it would have
been logical to conclude that Roberts was deliberately written to
be the last word from the Supreme Court on the Confrontation
Clause, especially in light of the Court having been somewhat
beaten in its ventures into the Confrontation Clause melee. It was
realistic to assume that the Supreme Court had decided to leave
this field of battle with the last paragraph in Roberts being the beall, end-all law on the subject of Confrontation. However, the
Supreme Court soon realized that Roberts was not the end of the
Court's battle over Confrontation. The Supreme Court soon reentered the Confrontation Clause thicket."
8. Id. at 66 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) and
quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) and Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 86 (1970)) (Court's footnote omitted).
9. Id. (Court's footnote omitted).
10. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)).
11. See Nancy H. Bauhan, White v. Illinois: The Confrontation Clause and
the Supreme Court's Preference for Out-Of-Court Statements, 46 VAND. L. REv.
235 (1993) (surveying the United States Supreme Court cases between the
Roberts decision and the White decision); S. Douglas Borisky, Reconciling the
Conflict Between the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, 85 CoLum. L. REv. 1294 (1985) (discussing the confusion created by
Roberts in the lower courts concerning the "firmly rooted hearsay exceptions"
and their relationship to the reliability prong); Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Confrontationand Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailability
Requirement 70 Mnq. L. Rnv. 665 (1986) (discussing the confusion created by
Roberts in the lower courts, about the unavailability prong and the court's
qualification of that prong in a footnote to the Roberts opinion).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
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In United States v. Inadi,12 the United States Supreme Court
tackled co-conspirator hearsay statements and how they could be
squared at trial with the language in Roberts that "the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that [the declarant] is
unavailable."' 3 The Court considered the reliability of such statements,' 4 the necessity for such statements, 15 the lack of any real
benefit to a defendant to have such previous co-conspirator on the
witness stand, 16 and the burden to the prosecution and the
defense from having to find such person.' 7 Then the Court indicated that the Confrontation Clause did not mandate a showing of
unavailability of such co-conspirator declarant before his co-conspirator statements might be received in evidence.'" Writing for
the Court, Justice Powell stated that Roberts as well as the cases
Roberts cited, were former testimony hearsay exception cases,
which have always required a showing of "unavailability" as part
of their foundation. 19 Perhaps foreshadowing White v. Illinois,
the Court in Inadi stated, "Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand
for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be
introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable."20 Inadi resolved the first prong of Roberts,
the unavailability prong, but it still left the adequate "indicia of
reliability" prong. This matter was resolved the following year by
the United States Supreme Court in the case of Bourjaily v.
United States,21 where the Court held that "the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule is firmly rooted enough in our jurisprudence that, under the holding in Roberts, a Court need not
independently inquire into the reliability of such statements."2 2
12. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
13. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
14. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395.
15. Id. at 395-96.
16. Id. at 396-98.
17. Id. at 399.
18. Id. at 399-400.
19. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 393-94 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968);
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-804(b)(1) (1992).
20. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394 (italics added).
21. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
22. Id. at 183. See generally Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "FirmlyRooted:"
Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1987); Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Constitutionalizationof Hearsay: The Extent to Which the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments Permitor Require the Liberalizationof the Hearsay
Rules, 76 MmN. L. REV. 521 (1992).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss1/1
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Many observers of the United States Supreme Court opinions
were of the view that these two decisions in 1986 and 1987 dealt
simply with the co-conspirator exception and did not themselves
deal, or at least deal much, with other hearsay exceptions. As for
other hearsay exceptions, many observers thought that they had
to be answered by the two-prong principles of Roberts, cited yet
again in Idaho v. Wright,23 particularly as set forth in the "in
sum" paragraph cited from Roberts.2 4 Such thoughts were erased,
in large measure, by White. Even a quick reading of the case
makes apparent that the words of Roberts, are now "Gone With
The Wind."
II.

THE CASE

White is an unanimous opinion of the United States Supreme
Court written by Chief Justice Rehnquist 25 . There was a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas which was joined in by Justice
Scalia, but that concurring opinion opted for an even more restrictive view of the Confrontation Clause than was adopted by the
other seven judges 2 6. Therefore, it is clear to see that the entire
Supreme Court today, including Justice Blackmun, the author of
Roberts, now subscribes to what may fairly be called "new wine in
an old bottle."
The actual facts of White do not differ much from the facts
that are likely to be encountered in any child abuse, child molestation or child sexual assault case that a lawyer is likely to encounter in North Carolina or any other place in the United States. In
White, a four-year-old child, while being babysat by a responsible
person, screamed out in the night and as the babysitter came to
the child's room, he saw the defendant leave the room. 27 The
babysitter asked the child what had happened, and the child said
that the defendant had "touched her in the wrong places" and then
pointed to her vaginal area.2 8 Some thirty minutes later the
child's mother returned, finding her child scared and agitated.2 9
23. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). See also Donald A. Dripps, The ConfrontationClause
and the Sexual Abuse of Children, TRIAL, May 1991, at 11.
24. See supra note 9 and accompanying text ("in sum" paragraph from
Roberts).
25. White, 112 S. Ct. at 739.
26. Id. at 744.
27. Id. at 739.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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In response to the mother's questions, the child repeated what she
had told the babysitter and added that the defendant had "put his
mouth on her front part."30 The police were then called and
apparently arrived in about fifteen minutes. 3 1 The police questioned the child, who repeated what she had told the babysitter
and her mother and added that the defendant had "used his
tongue in her private part."32 Some four hours after the babysitter had first heard the child scream, the child was taken to a hospital and examined by an emergency room nurse and then by a
doctor.3 3 The child told the nurse and the doctor essentially what
she told the sitter and her mother and the police.34 At trial, the
child was present but did not testify, and the trial court made no
finding that the child was unavailable. 35 The babysitter, the
mother, and the police all testified as to the child's hearsay statements to them.36 The admission of that hearsay was upheld by an
Illinois appellate court under the spontaneous declarations
[excited utterance] hearsay exception.37 The hearsay statements
of the child as made to the nurse and the doctor were upheld by
the court under the hearsay exception for statements made to
secure medical treatment or diagnosis.38
III.

THE CouR's A sALYSis

First, the Court had to address the language it had used in
Roberts. The Court acknowledged that it had "used language that
might suggest that the Confrontation Clause generally requires
that a declarant either be produced at trial or be found unavailable before his out-of-court statement may be admitted into evidence."39 It dealt with the unavailability prong of Roberts by
simply saying that "such an expansive reading of the Clause [was]
negated by [the Court's] subsequent decision in Inadi. "40 The
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. White, 112 S. Ct. at 739.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. White, 112 S. Ct. at 740. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-803(2) (1992)
(North Carolina's excited utterance exception).
38. White, 112 S. Ct. at 740. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-803(4) (1992)
(North Carolina's statement for purposes of medical diagnosis exception).
39. White, 112 S. Ct. at 741.
40. Id. (citation omitted).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss1/1
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court further narrowed the case by stating that "Roberts stands
for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a necessary part
of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged outof-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding."41 Thus, the Court stated, and perhaps meant, that the
unavailability of a hearsay declarant is only a Confrontation
Clause requirement when you are talking about one single hearsay exception, namely that of former testimony, which is embodied in the Federal and North Carolina rules of evidence. 42
The Court also discussed the manner in which it had distinguished co-conspirators' statements from former testimony in
Inadi by stating "unlike former in-court testimony, co-conspirator
statements 'provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in court,'' 4 3 and went on to add that "these observations,
although expressed in the context of evaluating co-conspirator
statements, apply with full force to the case at hand."4" The opinion notes that:
The evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony
regarding spontaneous declarations and statements made in the
course of receiving medical care is that such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of
their trustworthiness. But those same factors that contribute to
the statements' reliability cannot be recaptured even by later incourt testimony.... [A] statement made in the course of procuring

medical services, where declarant knows that a false statement
may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not think replicated by
courtroom testimony.' 5
The Court then goes on in White to state the following in one
paragraph:
The preference for live testimony in the case of statements like
those offered in Roberts is because of the importance of crossexamination:" the greatest legal engine ever invented is the discovery of truth" (citation omitted). Thus courts have adopted the
general rule prohibiting the receipt of hearsay evidence. But
where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-804(b)(1) (1992).
43. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742 (citing Inadi).
44. Id. at 742.
45. Id. at 742-43.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
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come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.'4
This italicized quote amounts to the most important holding
in this case. It takes one of the alternative bases of satisfying the
second prong of the Roberts opinion and makes that prong, and it
alone, the current basis of admissibility under the Confrontation
Clause for many, perhaps most, hearsay statements. 47 The
defendant argued that two other recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court entitled him to relief", namely, Coy v.
Iowa 49 and Maryland v. Craig.5 0 But the Court quickly dismissed
this argument by stating that those cases "involved only the question of what in-court procedures are constitutionally required to
guarantee a defendant's confrontation right once a witness is testifying.""' The Court determined this was a "quite separate [question] from that of what requirements the Confrontation Clause
imposes as a predicate for the introduction of out-of-court declarations,"5 2 and that "Coy and Craig did not speak to the latter
question.

53

IV.

SIGNIFICANCE

In light of all the twists and turns that the Confrontation
Clause decisions the United States Supreme Court have taken
from 1965 through 1992, it would not be wise to attempt to give a
definitive answer to what the federal Confrontation Clause means
or requires. The cases leading to White have proven that no definitive answer can safely be found within that one main paragraph
of Roberts written in 1980. 5 ' Assuming White to be the law for at
least the moment, it appears that some things can be safely said to
the trial judges and trial lawyers of North Carolina.
It seems clear enough that at trial, when the State offers
hearsay, the Court should conduct a brief voir dire at which time
the proffered hearsay is heard in full. At that time, the trial court
46. Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
47. See infra Appendix A (list of "firmly rooted" exceptions).
48. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
49. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
50. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
51. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743-4.
52. Id. at 744.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 11 (collecting articles discussing the confusion caused by
Roberts).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss1/1
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makes a one-step determination and ruling. If the trial judge
finds that the proffered hearsay fits within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, then that is both the beginning and the
end of the inquiry. 5 The evidence is admissible under both the
exception to the hearsay rule that it fits and is also admissible
under the Confrontation Clause. It makes no constitutional difference that the out-of-court declarant is sitting right next to the
District Attorney at the trial itself. No showing of the hearsay
declarant's unavailability is required. Thus, the two-prong
requirements of Roberts have apparently become one requirement
for a great deal of hearsay.5 6
But what if the prosecution's proffered hearsay does not fit
within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule? Apparently
a two-prong version of Roberts still exists: to wit, that the State
would have to show (1) the unavailability of the hearsay declarant
to be a witness at trial and (2) particularized guarantees of trustworthiness of the proffered hearsay.
White overrules several North Carolina cases, insofar as they
were based on the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In
State v. Kerley,5 7 the North Carolina Court of Appeals, citing the
Sixth Amendment, held that evidence which was otherwise
admissible as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2) was constitutionally inadmissible because the State of North Carolina failed
to produce the hearsay declarant or to show reasonable efforts to
produce that declarant. White also overturns State v. Fearing,
which reversed a trial judge for accepting the stipulations of the
State and defense that the minor child victim declarant was
unavailable5 9 . Of interest, as though the North Carolina Supreme
Court anticipated White, is the recent major decision of State v.
Stager,6 ° where the North Carolina Supreme Court said that
"statements falling within an exception to the general prohibition
against hearsay may be admitted into evidence without violating
a defendant's right to confrontation, if the evidence is reliable."6 '
55. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 8C-104(a) (outlining the procedure for dealing with
preliminary questions of admissibility).
56. See White, 112 S.Ct. at 743 (holding that hearsay falling within a firmly
rooted exception is admissible without regard for the availability of the witness).
57. 87 N.C. App. 240, 360 S.E.2d 464 (1987).
58. 315 N.C. 167, 337 S.E.2d 551 (1985).
59. Id.
60. 329 N.C. 278, 406 S.E.2d 876 (1991).

61. 329 N.C. 278, 317, 406 S.E.2d 876, 898 (1991).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
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It appears that the one overriding question, which will arise
in every instance in which the State seeks to have hearsay evidence admitted, is whether that hearsay evidence falls within a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception. What hearsay exceptions are
firmly rooted? Is it determined by age alone? Number of jurisdictions now accepting? Or is it also a question of whether those factors that would indicate reliability at the time the statement was
made would be difficult or impossible to recapture at the time of
trial?62 Determining what a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception is
will be the main battle in future trials. Roberts itself indicated
that the business records and public records exceptions were
firmly rooted. 63 Bourjaily v. U. S. establishes that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly rooted. 6' White establishes that both the excited utterance exception 5 as well as the
exception for statements made for the purpose
of medical treat67
ment and diagnosis 66 are firmly rooted.
In his definitive book on the law of evidence, Modern State
and Federal Evidence,68 Professor Michael H. Graham indicates
in his section on hearsay and the Confrontation Clause that:
[s]tatements falling within any traditional common law hearsay
exception are sufficiently reliable on their face to be admitted
against the accused, and that the imposition of a requirement of
unavailability by the Confrontation Clause is congruent with the
requirement of unavailability as applied to the traditional common law hearsay exceptions: "If it's good enough for the Federal
Rules of69 Evidence, its good enough for the Confrontation
Clause."
The bottom line is that if Professor Graham's statement
proves to be true, then the Confrontation Clause simply means
that the current Federal Rules of Evidence have now been constitutionalized, as to the Sixth Amendment, when offered by the
State in a criminal case. And you will note that there are some
hearsay exceptions set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence that
62. See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 22.
63. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
64. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183.

65. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
66. Id.
67. See infra Appendix A for a more detailed accounting of those hearsay
exceptions considered "firmly rooted".
68. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A
COMPREHENsIvE REFERENCE TExr (Patricia C. Bobb et al. eds., 1989).

69. Id. at 312-13.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss1/1
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were not carried forth by the North Carolina General Assembly
into the North Carolina Code of Evidence. 7° This raises the interesting question as to whether some evidence that might be offered
by the State in a state criminal trial would meet the Confrontation
Clause requirements of the U.S. Constitution but somehow not be
specifically mentioned by the North Carolina Evidence Code.
Would they be admissible or not?
Yet, White clearly indicates that when a trial lawyer or trial
judge in the State Courts of North Carolina looks at the North
Carolina Evidence Code in light of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, the following emerges: Any hearsay evidence
that would be admissible under the exceptions set forth in Rule
80171 are probably automatically admissible under the Confronta-

tion Clause; any evidence that would be received under the exception's set forth in Rule 80372 are probably automatically
admissible except for 803(24)73, under the Confrontation Clause.
And any hearsay evidence which would be admitted under Rule
80471 would have to meet both the requirements of unavailability
and of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
V.

IMPEACHMENT OF HEARSAY DECLARANT

It is highly probable that as a direct result of this most recent
landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court there will
be an increased use of hearsay in criminal trials offered by the
prosecution against the criminal defendant. It is equally clear
that the defense lawyer in a criminal case, in order to provide the
defendant client effective assistance of counsel required by the
7
constitution, must be prepared to deal with such hearsay. 1
In North Carolina, before the evidence code was adopted in
1984, the common law evidence rule of allowable impeachment
cross-examination was wide open and brutally simple. Any witness, including the criminally accused, could be impeached by
70. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(22).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-801 (1992).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-803 (1992).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-803(24) (1992).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-804 (1992).
75. For an exposition on how to impeach the credibility of an out-of-court
declarant, see Anthony M. Brannon, Successful Shadowboxing: The Art of
Impeaching Hearsay Declarants, 13 CAMPBELL L. REv. 157 (1991). See also
DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK (Wendy Bliss & Frear Simons eds., 3rd ed.
1991).
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being cross-examined with "disparaging questions concerning collateral matters relating to his criminal and degrading conduct."7 6
Everyone thought that the new evidence code made a drastic
change in the very old North Carolina trial practice of "make your
client happy even if he has no case by beating up on the other
side's witness" on their cross- examination. All the legal commentators 7 7 on the new code thought that the new Rules of Evidence
prohibited this tactic, particularly new Rule 608(b) 78 and new
Rule 40479 when Rule 404 made character evidence inadmissable
for proving conduct except for evidence of a witnesses' character
under Rules 607, 608, and 609.80 Rule 608 limits the use of specific instances of a witnesses' conduct to cross-examination "concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness."" For
example, Laura Crumpler and Gordon Widenhouse in their article, An Analysis of the New North CarolinaEvidence Code: Opportunity for Reform,"2 said "Rule 608 will radically alter [our prior
practice]. By limiting impeachment by... specific acts solely to
that evidence that bears on the witness' truth and veracity, it will
eliminate completely the use3 of evidence showing merely a witness' bad moral character."
Further proof of this seemingly drastic change in North Carolina impeachment law came quickly enough from the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Morgan.4 There Justice Meyer
said, "Rule 608(b) represents a drastic departure from the former
traditional North Carolina practice which allowed a defendant to
be cross-examined for impeachment purposes regarding any prior
act of misconduct ... so long as the [cross-examiner] had a goodfaith basis for the questions."8 5 The opinion then went on to add
76. State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971). See also State v.
Jean, 310 N.C. 157, 311 S.E.2d 266 (1984) for the high-water mark (or low ebb) of
this wide-open rule.
77. See, e.g., Laura E. Crumpler & Gordon Widenhouse, An Analysis of the
New North CarolinaEvidence Code: Opportunity for Reform, 20 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1 (1984). But see Gary R. Govert, Stuck in a Sebonian Bog: State v. Jean
and the Future of CharacterImpeachment in North Carolina,63 N.C. L. REV. 535
(1985).
78. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).

79.

FED.

R.

EVID.

404.

80. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3).
81. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
82. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 77.
83. Id. at 47.

84. 315 N.C. 626, 340 S.E.2d 84 (1986).
85. Id. at 634, 340 S.E.2d at 89 (citations omitted).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss1/1

12

Brannon: Confrontation and Hearsay: New Wine in an Old Bottle

1994]

CONFRONTATION AND HEARSAY

that "Rule 608(b) addresses the admissibility of specific instances
of conduct ...

only in the very narrow instance where ...

the

purpose of producing the evidence is to impeach or enhance credibility by proving that the witness' conduct indicates his character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness."8 6 The opinion further limited
such evidence by stating that "[elven if the trial judge allows the
inquiry on cross-examination [after evaluating its admissibility
under the balancing test of Rule 403], extrinsic evidence of the conduct is not admissible."8 7
Until 1992, Rule 608(b) was similarly construed by all North
Carolina courts, trial and appellate, without exception. However,
State v. Williams, 8 decided January 27, 1992, signaled a partial
return of impeachment law and procedure to the pre-code rough
and tumble days. The operative facts of the case, in chronological
order were as follows. One Carroll, a "key state witness," regularly
smoked marijuana and cocaine from 1987 through 1989 while in
high school.8 9 Carroll had attempted suicide twice in 1987,
because of depression and had received psychiatric counselling in
1987 as a result of the suicide attempts. 90 In January 1989, a
young lady was murdered, and Carroll was a suspect. 91 Carroll
was questioned by the police, gave conflicting accounts, and finally
gave a statement indicating the defendant, Williams, as the
killer.

92

At trial, Carroll's testimony was similar to his last statement
given to the police, identifying the defendant, Williams, as the
killer. 93 On cross-examination, the able trial judge allowed the
defendant's attorney to elicit evidence that Carroll had several
misdemeanor convictions 94 and that a condition of his suspended
sentences from these convictions was that he seek help from the
local county mental health clinic. 95 It was also established that
his reputation for truthfulness was that "he lied quite a bit" and
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id., 340 S.E.2d at 90 (emphasis added).
330 N.C. 711, 412 S.E.2d 359 (1992).
Id. at 713, 412 S.E.2d at 361.
Id.
Williams, 330 N.C. at 713, 412 S.E.2d at 360.
Id.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 715, 412 S.E.2d at 362. See also FED. R. EVID. 609.
95. Williams, 330 N.C. at 715, 412 S.E.2d at 362.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994

13

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1

"fantasized."96 Moreover, he had smoked marijuana cigarettes
laced with cocaine once or twice a week on or about the date of the
murder. 9 7 The trial judge forbade cross-examination of Carroll
about his prior drug habit, attempted suicides, and psychiatric
98
counselling.
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with
the trial judge that Rule 608(b), as construed in State v. Morgan,
did forbid such cross-examination,9 9 but holding that under Rule
611(b), such cross-examination was allowable. 10 0 The Court
observed quite properly, that "[t]here is no rule of evidence which
provides that testimony admissible for one purpose [Rule 611(b)]
and inadmissible for another purpose [Rule 608(b)] is thereby rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case." 1 1 The Court
observed that Rule 611(b) allows a witness to be "cross-examined
on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including
credibility."O2
The Williams court went on to acknowledge that "the language of the rule alone does not clearly illuminate the issue here,
the case law and treatises interpreting it establish that evidence
of [a witness'] drug use, his suicide attempts, and his psychiatric
history is proper and admissible for purposes of impeachment." 0 3
The rationale for the Court's new holding is clear and logical.
As the court phrased it, "[w]hile specific instances of drug use or
mental instability are not directly probative of truthfulness, they
may bear upon credibility in other ways, such as to 'cast doubt
upon the capacity of a witness to observe, recollect, and
recount.'"' 14 The North Carolina Supreme Court, citing Weinstein's Evidence, said that while Rule 608 deals with "moral
96. Id. at 716-17, 412 S.E.2d at 363. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3), 405(a),
803(21).
97. Williams, 330 N.C. at 715, 412 S.E.2d at 362.
98. Id at 717 (citing Rule 608(b) and State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 340 S.E.
2d 84 (1986)).
99. Williams, 330 N.C. at 719, 412 S.E.2d at 364.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 56 (1984)).

102.

FED.

R.

EVID.

611(b) (emphasis added).

103. Williams, 330 N.C. at 719, 412 S.E.2d at
Court did not cite to any post-code North Carolina
104. Id. (quoting 3 DAVID W. LoUISELL AND
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 305, at 263 (1979))(emphasis

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss1/1

364 (emphasis added). The
cases.
CHRISTOPHER

B.

MUELLER,

added).
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inducements" or the character trait for truth-telling,
Rule 611(b)
05
deals with the mental capacity for truth-telling.1
VI.

CONCLUSION

What is the possible impact of this new case on future trials in
North Carolina? It can be considerable if the trial lawyer reads it
and is alert to its possibilities in her cases, be they civil or
criminal.

First, how can the lawyer find out about such information,
usually considered both sensitive and private by most people? In
civil cases, the lawyer can find it through discovery and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 6 In criminal cases, the only possible discovery vehicle is a "Brady-Agurs" Motion.107 For the
enterprising lawyer there is an additional possible avenue. Check
the courthouse records for the witness' past criminal case files, if
any. You may find, through careful examination, that your hostile
witness was another lawyer's criminal defendant client. After this
prior defendant was sent to a state mental hospital for pre-trial
examination, a most interesting psychiatric report was sent back
to the courthouse. Assuming there are no applicable state statutory privacy privileges (and I'm certainly not assuming it),10 8 the
report could be a veritable gold mine of impeachment nuggets.
Employ the "voice over" insistent tones of today's thirty-second
political attack ads, and you may be able, by Williams impeachment alchemy, to turn gold into pyrite.
A further piece of dynamite in Williams is the quote from
Louisell & Mueller's Federal Evidence that Williams' impeachment material - mental health treatment, drug use, suicide
attempts, civil commitments, alcohol problems is "properly the
subject not only of cross-examination but of extrinsic evidence."109
This phrase means, at least, that you're not "bound by the witness'
answer." These subjects are not collateral. You may yourself
introduce other evidence on these subjects to refute the witness'

denials, if any, and thereby doubly impeach the witness. This is a
powerful sword for an able advocate!
105. Id. (citing 3
added).

LOUISELL

& MUELLER, supra note 104, at § 305)(emphasis

FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
107. See, e.g., State v. Boone, 307 N.C. 198, 297 S.E.2d 585 (1982).
108. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002(d) (1992).
109. Williams, 330 N.C. at 719, 412 S.E.2d at 364 (quoting 3 LOUISELL &
MUELLER, supra note 104, § 305, at 263)(emphasis added).

106. See, e.g.,
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How far back in the witness' life closet can you reach for these
Williams skeletons? Since Rule 611 says nothing about time
frames, the United States Supreme Court had to look elsewhere
for "authority" with which to enclose their new creation. It chose
to cite an Eleventh Circuit case requiring a ten-year limitation. 110
Not mentioned in the opinion, but obviously known to the justices,
is the ten-year general limitation set forth in Rule 609(b)"1 for
prior criminal convictions.

110. U.S. v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983).
111. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss1/1
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APPENDIX

A

"Firmly Rooted" Hearsay Exceptions

-

Authorities

RULE 801(d). Admissions by a Party-Opponent
801(d)(B) "Adoptive Admission"
State v. Marshall, 335 N.W.2d 612 (Wis. 1983).
801(d)(D) Agent Admission
U.S. v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1992).
801(d)(E) Co-conspirator Statement
Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
RULE 803.
Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant
Immaterial
803(1)
Present Sense Impression
Brown v. Tard, 552 F.Supp. 1341 (1982).
803(2)
Excited Utterance
White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 281 S.E.2d 377 (1981).
Washington v. Palomo, 783 P.2d 575 (Wash. 1989).
803(3)
Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical
Condition (state of mind)
State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 406 S.E.2d 876 (1991).
Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1982).
803(4)
Statements for Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or
Treatment
White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
803(5)
Recorded Past Recollection
U.S. v.-Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966).
803(6)
Business Records
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.6 (1980) ("Properly
administered, the business and public records
exceptions would seem to be among the safest of the
hearsay exceptions."); J. Brooks Greer, III, Comment,
Hearsay, The Confrontation Guarantee and Related
Problems, 30 LA. L. REv. 651, 668 (1970). But see
Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930). The
business record exception, not recognized at common
law, is a creature of statute. See also U.S. v. Ray, 920
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Norton, 867 F.2d
1354 (11th Cir. 1989).
803(8)
Public Records
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See supra,
exception found in Rule 803(6) above.
U.S. v. DeWater, 846 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1988).
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803(9)
803(17)

803(18)
RULE 804.
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Vital Statistics
Segrest v. Gillette, 331 N.C. 97, 414 S.E.2d 334 (1992)
(death certificates).
Trade Reports
In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (to require the declarant's production,
as to learned treatises and trade reports, would be
"unduly inconvenient and of small utility").
Learned Treatises
See supra, exception found in Rule 803(17).
Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable.

804(b)(1) Former Testimony
Ohio v. Roberts 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
U.S. v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir. 1989).
U.S. v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988).
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (where
opportunity for cross-examination was available and
availed of).
804(b)(2) Statement Under Belief of Impending Death
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
804(b)(3) Statement Against Interest
Berrisford v. Wood, 826 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987)
(penal interest); contra Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421
(8th Cir. 1982).
U.S. v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989); Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986) (holding that a confession
of one defendant may be inadmissible against other
co-defendants because such statements against penal
interest are presumptively unreliable hearsay as to
things said against the declarant's co-defendants, but
this presumption is rebuttable). See U.S. v. York, 933
F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1991); Jennings v. Maynard, 946
F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1991); New Mexico v. Earnest, 477
U.S. 648 (1986).
804(b)(5) Other
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1980) (holding that the
residual exceptions are not "firmly rooted").
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